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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The marketplace metaphor that Justice Holmes deployed in 
Abrams v. United States makes “truth” central to the system of free 
speech.1  Judges, lawyers, and scholars have now spent a century 
unpacking the origins, viability, breadth, alternatives, and desirability of 
that metaphor.2  Their inquiries have at least one important question in 
common: what did Holmes mean by the “truth” for which the 
competition of the marketplace is the best test? 
 
 
*Lanty L. Smith ‘67 Professor of Law, Duke Law School.  Many thanks to Vince Blasi, 
Thomas Healy, James Weinstein, and the other organizers of the symposium on Abrams 
v. United States’ centennial held at Columbia Law School on November 8, 2019.  Thanks 
also to the friends and colleagues who helped me try to identify examples of legal 
scholars who have openly repudiated positions they once held.  Our collective difficulty 
in doing so provided much of the impetus for this Essay, though of course they bear no 
blame for any of its flaws. 
 1 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 2 No string cite could possibly suffice, but would have to include ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 73 (1965) (arguing that establishing truth through a 
marketplace of ideas “is not merely the ‘best’ test.  There is no other.”); Vincent Blasi, 
Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1; William P. Marshall, In Defense 
of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“In 
Speech Clause jurisprudence, for example, the oft-repeated metaphor that the First 
Amendment fosters a marketplace of ideas that allows truth to ultimately prevail over 
falsity has been virtually canonized.”). 
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In his voluminous and often-illuminating private correspondence, 
Holmes answered that question with another metaphor: “All I mean by 
truth is the road I can’t help travelling.”3  He went on: “What the worth 
of that can’t help may be I have no means of knowing.  Perhaps the 
universe, if there is one, has no truth outside of the finiteness of man.”4  
Holmes repeatedly returned to this notion of truth as a “can’t help,” 
suggesting that it constitutes a kind of intellectual bedrock (like some 
personal preferences) beyond the power of persuasion,5 even while 
recognizing that society itself depends on others holding the same “can’t 
helps”:  
“I can’t help” is the ultimate.  If we are sensible men and not 
crazy on-ists of any sort, we recognize that if we are in a 
minority of one we are likely to get locked up and then find a 
test or qualifications by reference to some kind of majority 
vote actual or imagined.  Of course the fact that mankind or 
that part of it that we take into account are subject to most of 
the same can’t helps as ourselves makes society possible, but 
what interests me is that we start with an arbitrary limit 
which I know no reason for believing is a limit to the cosmos 
of which I am only a small part.6 
One can hear strains of Abrams in the passage.  After all, if “[p]ersecution 
for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical,”7 then it is 
indeed “sensible” to recognize that a minority of one “can’t help” will be 
“locked up.” 
 
 3 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock (Oct. 27, 1901), in 
1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS at 100 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941); Id. at 139 (“[A]ll I mean by 
truth is what I can’t help thinking.”) (both cited in Blasi, supra note 2, at 11 n.36). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See infra text accompanying note 45 (“Deep-seated preferences cannot be argued 
about—you can not argue a man into liking a glass of beer . . . .”).  Holmes’s belief that 
discussion is eventually pointless and that the cosmos is ultimately unknowable (what 
Wittgenstein might call the “ineffable”) do call to mind the famous final line of the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”  
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 7 (1961).  The Tractatus was 
completed in the summer of 1918, as Abrams was making its way to the Court, though it 
would not be published until 1921, and then only in German.  To my knowledge, 
Holmes’s broad and deep reading never included Wittgenstein, but his taste for the 
mystical and ineffable—consider the final lines of The Path of the Law—is of a piece.  
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE PATH OF THE LAW 40–41 (American Classics Library ed. 
2012) (“The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it 
universal interest.  It is through them that you not only become a great master in your 
calling, but connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a 
glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law.”). 
 6 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock (Oct. 26, 1929) in 
2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, at 255–56 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941).  
 7 United States v. Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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In other ways, though, Holmes’s notion of truth seems to be in 
tension with his embrace of the marketplace metaphor in Abrams.  What 
is the point of “competition” among things that one “can’t help”?  How 
can such a “market” ever lead to “acceptance” if none of the participants 
can change?   
One possibility, of course, is that Holmes meant simply to valorize 
the fight and to suggest that we have no choice but to take up arms on 
behalf of our own “can’t helps,” even as others do the same for theirs 
(and perhaps, we must recognize, with equally good reason).  Holmes 
was, after all, quite comfortable with martial imagery and the heroism 
of doomed, dutiful warriors.8 
But the central metaphor in Abrams is the marketplace, not the 
battlefield—of “free trade” and “competition,” rather than a bayonet 
charge.  In that respect, Holmes’s opinion seems to suggest a system of 
beliefs that can adapt and change, at the societal and even individual 
level.  Scholars of Abrams have understandably devoted most of their 
attention to Holmes’s remarkable argument for the logic of persecution 
and his even more powerful defense of free speech.  And yet it is the 
pivot point between those themes that is most suggestive of the role of 
change in discourse: “[W]hen men have realized that time has upset 
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they 
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . .”9 
Men can realize; they can come to believe.  How?  What role is there 
for persuasion and change on matters of truth, if “I can’t help is the 
ultimate”?  Is it only happenstance that “mankind or that part of it that 
we take into account are subject to most of the same can’t helps”?  If we 
find ourselves or others traveling the wrong roads, how can we change 
course?  
Others have written in great depth about the central role of the 
marketplace metaphor in First Amendment law and scholarship,10 and 
 
 8 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Soldier’s Faith, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE 
HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES 486, 487 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995) (“[T]here is one thing I do not doubt . . . 
and that is that the faith is true and adorable which leads a soldier to throw away his life 
in obedience to a blindly accepted duty, in a cause which he little understands, in a plan 
of campaign of which he has no notion, under tactics of which he does not see the use.”). 
 9 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 10 See supra note 2.  My own attempts to investigate the metaphor have mostly 
focused on how it interacts with the institutions and social practices needed to support 
the pursuit of truth.  See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief, 133 
HARV. L. REV. 439 (2019); Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 821 (2008). 
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what Holmes meant by truth.11  The goal of this Essay is to bring those 
two inquiries together, not by mixing metaphors (“the best test of the 
road I can’t help travelling is to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market”), but by considering what the “can’t help” vision of truth 
means for a system of free speech that presupposes—or at least 
prizes—the possibility of change.  
In particular, the discussion here will focus on the constitutional 
relevance of persuadability—the willingness and ability to change one’s 
mind—and how it might factor into the effectiveness of a marketplace 
of ideas or any “dynamic” theory of free speech in which the set of ideas 
changes.12  Most analyses of free speech dynamism and the 
characteristics needed to support it have focused on the persuasiveness 
of speakers, or on the degree to which listeners can overcome cognitive 
limitations and biases.  But persuadability is something different, or at 
least the ability to overcome a very specific kind of bias—that in favor 
of one’s existing beliefs.  It is also distinct from skepticism, which 
typically connotes a willingness to doubt premises and beliefs, rather 
than a willingness to hold but revise them.  
The marketplace metaphor, in other words, seems premised on the 
notion that ideas can change, which in turn suggests that people can be 
persuaded.  Such change and persuasion are easier to observe the 
farther one zooms out—groups and societies change their beliefs and 
ways of thinking in important and obvious ways that were perfectly 
congenial to Holmes.13  He does not seem to have believed in collective 
“can’t helps.”  The harder question is whether individuals are 
persuadable.  Here, Holmes seems less optimistic.  Perhaps change only 
comes intergenerationally, or as open-minded and uninformed people 
write beliefs on blank slates, or as certain “can’t helps” are persecuted 
or silenced.14 
 
 11 See, e.g., Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John 
Stuart Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 35 (2010); Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1015, 1039, 1056–57 (2015). 
 12 See, e.g., GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST 
AMENDMENT (2017) (describing a defending “dynamic diversity” as a central free speech 
value). 
 13 See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.  
 14 Blasi, supra note 2, at 26 (internal citation omitted) (“[T]he theory of evolution 
might help to explain why a robust freedom of speech can be extremely valuable even 
when most individuals remain stubbornly impervious to demonstrably valid refutations 
of their beliefs. . . . As the population changes with the infusion of new persons with 
different ideas, the pattern of beliefs within the community changes, even if no single 
individual ever embraces a new idea or discards an old one.”). 
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And yet the Abrams dissent itself appears to be the result of just 
such an individual transformation—having spent most of his already-
lengthy career on the bench rejecting free speech claims, Holmes 
pivoted into the role that made him a hero for generations of civil 
libertarians.  Exploring that transformation, and how it came about, may 
help shed light on how the opinion is proof of its own concept.  And yet 
one will not find much help from Holmes himself.  As Thomas Healy 
notes in his magnificent book on Abrams, the title of which describes 
Holmes as having “changed his mind,”15 the Justice seemed to go to great 
lengths to deny that such a transformation had taken place.16  That, in 
turn, presents the question of whether it is important openly to 
acknowledge, and perhaps explain, one’s change of mind.  
The modest normative position of this Essay is that it does 
matter—that it is a free speech virtue to acknowledge when one has 
been persuaded, and that the particular discourse community of law 
offers a useful lens through which to consider that virtue.  Not only is 
persuasion (and therefore, although it receives less attention, 
persuadability) central to the very practice of law (and perhaps even 
constitutive thereof)17 but law has done more than most disciplines to 
self-consciously address changes of mind.  This is evident, for example, 
in the doctrine of stare decisis, which provides a set of explicit criteria 
by which courts and even individual judges (tracking the group versus 
individual persuadability distinction) can, and sometimes do, change 
their minds.18 
And that sets up the second Part of the Essay: a very brief and 
speculative foray into persuadability and the legal academy, where the 
distinction between individual and group persuasion appears 
particularly stark, especially if one is looking for explicit, individual 
acknowledgment of a changed position.  Schools of thought regularly—
and sometimes quickly—rise and fall, and yet it is difficult to identify 
 
 15 THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND—
AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (2013). 
 16 See infra notes 66–69. 
 17 James Boyd White, Law As Rhetoric, Rhetoric As Law: The Arts of Cultural and 
Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 (1985) (“Let us begin with the idea that the 
law is a branch of rhetoric. Who, you may ask, could ever have thought it was anything 
else?”).  See generally JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS 
OF THE LAW (1985). 
 18 To be more precise, the doctrine of stare decisis provides a set of rules for when 
the law should change—disagreement with a prior decision (the change of mind) is 
necessary but not sufficient.  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) 
(articulating various factors to guide the practice of stare decisis).  See generally RANDY 
J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017) (developing a theory of 
continuity in constitutional doctrine). 
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many examples of individual scholars openly repudiating views they 
once held.  (Sub silentio change is another matter, and harder to track.)  
It is far beyond the scope of this Essay or the ability of its author to 
suggest any firm conclusions or broad takeaways in that regard; the goal 
is just to offer a tentative observation and situate it in the larger 
discussion of persuadability.  And again, Holmes’s private 
correspondence offers a distinction that might be useful in partially 
addressing it—the distinction between “Thingsters” and “Ideasts.”19  
Thingsters are those who master bodies of facts and yearn for rules and 
testable hypotheses; Ideasts, of which Holmes counted himself, favor 
generalized principles and premises.  Thingsters and Ideasts not only 
make different kinds of arguments but are persuadable in different ways 
as well. 
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL RELEVANCE OF PERSUADABILITY 
In the century since Holmes launched the metaphor in Abrams, and 
with increasing vigor in recent decades, scholars have picked apart the 
assumptions that seem to animate the marketplace metaphor, including 
the very basic notion that competition is actually “the best test of truth.”  
Much of that literature has focused on the basic cognitive limitations 
that make it hard for people to engage with new ideas—racism, sexism, 
and other forms of bias being only the most obvious of those limits.20 
My focus here is on a particular element of that cognitive task—the 
willingness and ability to change one’s mind, to revise or repudiate a 
belief one holds.  I call this persuadability (and, appropriately enough, 
remain very open to revising or repudiating that label).  
 
 
 19 As far as I can tell, the distinction has only been noted once before in the legal 
literature.  See Charles P. Curtis, 63 YALE L.J. 266, 271 (1953) (reviewing HOLMES-LASKI 
LETTERS, 1916–1935 (Mark Dewolfe Howe, ed., 1953)) (noting that Holmes, in his own 
words, “divided ‘mankind around the two poles of emotion and thought—the poets at 
one end and the philosophers at the other.’ ‘I don’t like Goethe. . . . Perhaps at bottom it 
is that he is on the side of the poets and I prefer the philosophers. Goethe could not 
explain and so he said theory was gray.’ As Holmes said, he and Laski were both ‘ideasts 
rather than thingsters.’”).  Budiansky suggests that the distinction maps that between 
“internal men and external men”—a division proposed by a doctor in his Civil War 
regiment.  STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A LIFE IN WAR, LAW, AND IDEAS 128 
(2019).  
 20 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, 
and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 673–96 (2006); 
Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. 
U. L. REV. 343, 385–86 (1991); Susan H. Williams, Feminist Jurisprudence and Free Speech 
Theory, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1563 (1993). 
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Although the line is not clear (nor is it all that essential for the 
argument), belief-revision is distinct from belief-formation; it is a 
specific kind of open-mindedness.  It is one thing to be confronted with 
a new and disturbing fact—that, for example, the man you thought was 
your father has been beheaded by a malevolent boy-king.21  Such 
information can be assimilated into one’s mental framework without 
the need to displace anything that is already there (other than the belief 
that your father is alive).  It is quite another thing—and, for most people, 
probably a harder one—to be informed that the man you thought was 
your father was actually your uncle, your lover is actually your aunt, and 
instead of being a bastard you are actually the rightful heir to the 
throne.22  Accepting that information requires significant revision of 
existing beliefs (“ideas”), which generally presents a different cognitive 
task.  It is one thing to learn; another to un-learn and re-learn.  It might 
well be harder to discard an idea than to acquire one.   
The willingness and ability to change one’s existing views—to be 
persuaded—is also meaningfully distinct from (or at least combines 
distinct elements of) skepticism, curiosity, and other character traits 
that might make a person sensitive to the “competition” of ideas in the 
marketplace.23  In his correspondence with Holmes, Learned Hand 
suggested that “incredulity” can provide a basis for protecting free 
speech: “Tolerance is the twin of Incredulity,” because we must always 
acknowledge that our own presuppositions could be proven incorrect.24  
Holmes was unmoved: “If for any reason you did care enough [to stop a 
particular speech act] you wouldn’t care a damn for the suggestion that 
you were acting on a provisional hypothesis and might be wrong.  That 
is the condition of every act.”25 
 
 
 21 GAME OF THRONES: BAELOR (HBO television broadcast 2011) (death of Ned Stark). 
 22 GAME OF THRONES: WINTERFELL (HBO television broadcast 2019) (Jon Snow learns 
his true parentage).  
 23 Vince Blasi has argued persuasively that Abrams “contains the seeds of an 
understanding of the First Amendment that has more to do with checking, character, 
and culture than with the implausible vision of a self-correcting, knowledge-maximizing, 
judgment-optimizing, consent-generating and participation-enabling social 
mechanism.”  Blasi, supra note 2, at 2.   
 24 Quoted in HEALY, supra note 15, at 23.  For an insightful account of Hand’s views, 
see James Weinstein, The Story of Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten: Judge Learned Hand, 
First Amendment Prophet, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 62 (R. Garnett & A. Koppelman, 
eds., Found. Press 2011). 
 25 HEALY, supra note 15, at 24.  
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Skepticism comes the closest to persuadability and is a trait often 
associated with Holmes himself.26  It has in common with persuadability 
a willingness to change and to subject existing beliefs to testing.  But 
skepticism typically connotes doubt of the truth,27 while a person can 
have confident beliefs, even fundamental ones, and still be persuadable.  
Skepticism can corrode beliefs; persuadability makes them malleable.  
In any event, it is not my intention to attempt a novel intervention in the 
epistemological debates.  Nothing much turns on the labels, so if 
“skepticism” or “adaptability” or something else seems a better fit than 
“persuadability” then readers should feel free to make the substitution.  
A.  Abrams’ Theory of Persuasion 
With regard to persuadability, Abrams is more remarkable for what 
it shows than what it says; namely, that Holmes himself changed his 
mind about the First Amendment, though he was reluctant to admit or 
explain the change.28  But even taken on its own terms, the opinion 
contains interesting—if indirect and perhaps underappreciated—
language regarding persuadability.  
As many have noted, what the concluding paragraphs of the 
opinion do for the protection of speech, the opening paragraphs do for 
its persecution: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me 
perfectly logical.  If you have no doubt of your premises or 
your power and want a certain result with all your heart you 
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all 
opposition.  To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate 
that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that 
he has squared the circle, or that you do not care 
wholeheartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your 
power or your premises.29  
 
 26 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918) (“But while 
one’s experience thus makes certain preferences dogmatic for oneself, recognition of 
how they came to be so leaves one able to see that others, poor souls, may be equally 
dogmatic about something else. And this again means scepticism”).  I return to that 
passage below.  See infra note 46.  For a broader account, which includes Holmes, see 
Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988).  See also 
John Inazu, Holmes, Humility, and How Not to Kill Each Other, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1631, 
1632 (2019) (arguing that Abrams is best understood as expressing a kind of epistemic 
humility, not skepticism per se). 
 27 See generally PETER KLEIN, SKEPTICISM (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, June 
2, 2015), online at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/ (visited June 21, 
2019). 
 28 See infra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 29 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Holmes had hummed these opening bars before in private 
correspondence,30 and it is logically consistent with the vision he 
sometimes described (and even seemed to celebrate) of a world in 
which the strong will ultimately prevail, but all must struggle.  And yet, 
of course, logic has not been the life of the law; neither could it be the 
life of free speech.31  The fact that persecution of disfavored opinions 
appears “perfectly logical” is thus not enough to embrace it.  Just as 
“experience” trumps logic in the development of the law,32 seeing 
“fighting faiths” upset should lead men to “come to believe” that the free 
trade of ideas must be protected.33  
Before he reaches that conclusion, however, Holmes considers (in 
the final sentence of the passage above) three other possible 
justifications for permitting disfavored speech.  The second and third 
are that the would-be speech persecutor does not care enough about his 
own view prevailing, or that he doubts his power or premises.34  But the 
first feint is the most interesting: that failing to persecute an opinion 
with which one disagrees may be evidence that one thinks the opinion 
“impotent.”  If this premise is convincing, it would not be hard to 
transform it into an affirmative theory for the protection of speech—
precisely because speech is harmless, the government has no business 
regulating it.   
But it is evident that Holmes does not believe this to be true.  That 
speech is, or can be, efficacious is precisely why governments 
sometimes seek to stifle it.  Again, the pivot point in Abrams drives that 
message home, with the notion that “men have realized” and “come to 
believe” the basic premises of Holmes’s own theory. 
 
 30 In a letter to Laski in July of 1918, he wrote: 
My thesis would be (1) if you are cocksure, and (2) if you want it very 
much, and (3) if you have no doubt of your power—you will do what 
you believe efficient to bring about what you want—by legislation or 
otherwise.  
In most matters of belief we are not cocksure, we don’t care very 
much, and we are not certain of our power. But in the opposite case 
we should deal with the act of speech as we deal with any other over 
act that we don’t like. 
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski, (July 7, 1918), in HOLMES-LASKI 
LETTERS at 160–61 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953). 
 31 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881); HEALY, supra note 15, at 195 
(noting the parallel).   
 32 HOLMES, supra note 31, at 3. 
 33 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. 
 34 In his letter to Laski, Holmes suggested that “most matters of belief” fall into this 
category.  See supra note 30. 
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The boundaries of free speech can be drawn based in part on that 
very quality—the power of speech to persuade.35  Although Holmes 
sometimes casts doubt on the power of speech to persuade, his own 
doctrinal solutions seem shaped in no small part by his own belief that 
it can.  Effectively rejecting the common view that speech can be 
punished if it has a “bad tendency” (i.e., a chance, even if remote in odds 
and time, of generating bad results36) in Schenck v. United States, Holmes 
wrote that the “question in every case is whether the words used are 
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear 
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent.  It is a question of proximity and 
degree.”37  
Although Holmes found that test satisfied in Schenck—i.e., that the 
government could prohibit the speech at issue—his account helped 
provide a stronger basis for free speech going forward.38  And, more 
importantly for present purposes, it rested in no small part on an 
apparent belief that speech can persuade; that people’s minds can be 
changed.  Consider the false-shout-of-fire-in-a-crowded-theater 
hypothetical.39  One common explanation for why such speech—unlike 
other false speech—is punishable is that the circumstances give no 
room for counter-speech, for persuasion to run its course.40  Again, it 
seems implicit that Holmes believed people could be persuaded, albeit 
not in a panicked crowd. 
And yet Abrams does not necessarily provide many clues about 
how this conversion happens.  How does an idea “get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market”?  If truth is “the road I can’t help 
travelling,” can it ever be rerouted?  Who or what can be persuaded to 
 
 35 To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that speech can be restricted because of its 
persuasiveness, only that the persuasiveness of speech factors into its constitutional 
treatment.  Cf. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991) (arguing that speech cannot be restricted on account of its 
persuasiveness). 
 36 MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 9–12 (2000). 
 37 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 38 Zechariah Chafee, for one, suggested that the Schenck test could adequately 
protect speech, but that Holmes had effectively misapplied it.  Zechariah Chafee, 
Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 968–69 (1919). 
 39 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (“The most stringent protection of free speech would not 
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”).  Healy shows 
that Holmes lifted the example from federal prosecutor Edwin S. Wertz.  HEALY, supra 
note 15, at 91. 
 40 Carlton F.W. Larson, “Shouting ‘Fire’ in A Theater”: The Life and Times of 
Constitutional Law’s Most Enduring Analogy, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 181, 183–85 
(2015). 
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accept new ideas, especially if doing so means changing pre-existing 
beliefs?  
There are at least two broad possibilities: Groups and societies—
the market as a whole—can adapt.  The other, perhaps more 
challenging, possibility is that individuals can adapt.  The mechanisms 
and possibilities for each of these options are quite different.  
Descriptively, there is no denying that collectives are 
“persuadable” in the sense that prevailing beliefs can and do change.  
Recall that the pivot point in Abrams—the point where Holmes shifts 
from defending the logic of persecution to erecting a constitutional 
barrier against such persecution—refers to “when men have realized 
that time has upset many fighting faiths.”  Perhaps the use of the plural 
(“men,” not “a man”) is simply meant to suggest that a critical mass of 
realization is necessary for the marketplace metaphor to be embraced.  
But it might also be taken to suggest that society can change, even as 
individuals do not. 
In a powerful and insightful article distinguishing Holmes’s and 
John Stuart Mill’s views of “truth,”41 Irene Ten Cate shows that they had 
different views on how beliefs can change over time.  As Ten Cate 
explains, “Mill’s free speech theory is based on the idea that societal 
progress (indispensably fueled by a collective truth-seeking endeavor) 
is inextricably connected to individual development.”42  Holmes, by 
contrast, “is concerned with neither individual development nor the 
discovery of some external truth.  Rather, he values speech for its role in 
a dynamic process in which shifting interest groups are vying for 
dominance in a continually changing world.”43 
Moreover, communities are often much more ready to 
acknowledge, and even emphasize, the degree to which their collective 
ideas have changed.  Given the apparent reluctance of many individuals 
to acknowledge when they have been persuaded, it is notable that 
generations and groups sometimes go so far as to define themselves in 
opposition to what has come before.  Perhaps that is because the 
repudiated ideas were never theirs to begin with.  In any event, when 
and how that change happens will of course depend on the particular 
collective or discourse community at issue—political revolutions and 
 
 41 In keeping with my theme, I should acknowledge Ten Cate’s article as one that 
persuaded me.  She correctly identifies me as one of the scholars guilty of having 
“grouped [Mill and Holmes] together as representatives of the ‘marketplace of ideas’ 
rationale for free speech,” Ten Cate, supra note 11, at 38 n.13, when doing so “ignores 
significant differences between their free speech theories, and does not do justice to the 
complexity of either defense.” Id. at 81.  I can’t help but agree.  
 42 Id. at 39 (emphasis added). 
 43 Id. 
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scientific revolutions need not follow the same rules of change.  Nor will 
change always be easy, or even desirable.  The point is simply that 
change happens, is acknowledged, and is sometimes even celebrated.  
But this kind of change—significant as it may be—does not require 
anything of individuals.  A thought might “get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market” without ever actually persuading a single 
person.  After all, the participants in the marketplace change over time, 
and if an idea sticks around long enough it might gain acceptance in a 
new generation without ever shifting the battle lines in an old one.  
Persuadability at an individual level presents a much more difficult 
problem.  Scholars writing on cultural cognition and motivated 
reasoning have powerfully—heartbreakingly—argued that people are 
not moved by facts and “ideas” in the sense that most marketplace of 
ideas theorists probably conceptualize them.44  I have no new empirics 
or conceptual frameworks to add to that literature.  My more modest 
goal is simply to illustrate its stakes for a system of free speech in which 
persuadability seems significant to the pursuit of truth.  And the most 
appropriate place to begin is with Holmes himself.   
B.  Persuading Holmes 
Holmes consistently argued that some beliefs are not subject to 
reasoned debate and that some differences of opinion will ultimately be 
resolved by violence rather than the competition of ideas in the market.  
As he put it, “[d]eep-seated preferences cannot be argued about—you 
can not argue a man into liking a glass of beer—and therefore, when 
differences are sufficiently far reaching, we try to kill the other man 
rather than let him have his way.”45  But Holmes was also perfectly 
willing to concede that such dogmas are contingent on, rather than 
reflective of, any universal truth: “[T]hat is perfectly consistent with 
admitting that, so far as appears, his grounds are just as good as ours.”46  
While this leaves open the possibility that people can change their 
minds about trifles, it indicates that deep-seated preferences are rooted 
in personal experience, and are dogmatic but not universal:  
What we most love and revere generally is determined by 
early associations.  I love granite rocks and barberry bushes, 
 
 44 For one such article, focusing on persuasion as such, see Dan M. Kahan & Donald 
Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 
U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (2003).  Many thanks to Fred Schauer for pointing me to earlier 
literature in other disciplines.  See, e.g., Rasyid Sanitioso & Ziva Kunda, Ducking the 
Collection of Costly Evidence: Motivated Use of Statistical Heuristics, 4 J. BEHAV. DECISION 
MAKING 161 (1991). 
 45 Holmes, supra note 26, at 41.  
 46 Id. 
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no doubt because with them were my earliest joys that reach 
back through the past eternity of my life.  But while one’s 
experience thus makes certain preferences dogmatic for 
oneself, recognition of how they came to be so leaves one able 
to see that others, poor souls, may be equally dogmatic about 
something else.47  
Efforts to convince one of a different “truth” in such matters are likely to 
be perceived, and resisted, as attacks: “If I may quote myself again, 
property, friendship, and truth have a common root in time.  One cannot 
be wrenched from the rocky crevices into which one has grown for 
many years without feeling that one is attacked in one’s life.”48 
None of this seems to leave much room for individual persuasion 
or persuadability, at least not about anything that matters.  And yet, 
even in his own definition of “truth,” Holmes seemed to acknowledge 
some development and change over time: 
I used to say, when I was young, that truth was the majority 
vote of that nation that could lick all others.  Certainly we may 
expect that the received opinion about the present war will 
depend a good deal upon which side wins, (I hope with all my 
soul it will be mine), and I think that the statement was correct 
in so far as it implied that our test of truth is a reference to 
either a present or an imagined future majority in favor of our 
view.  If . . . the truth may be defined as the system of my 
(intellectual) limitations, what gives it objectivity is the fact 
that I find my fellow man to a greater or less extent (never 
wholly) subject to the same Can’t Helps.49 
Holmes refers to the truth-as-majority definition in the past tense.  And 
while he defends its partial correctness, he also shifts to the “can’t help” 
formulation.  It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Holmes has found a 
way out of his own “rocky crevices”; he has changed his mind.  
And that brings us back to Abrams.  Less than a year before he 
wrote his great dissent, Holmes wrote three other opinions dismissing 
First Amendment claims in cases with facts quite similar to Abrams.  In 
one, he upheld Eugene Debs’ conviction for having illegally obstructed 
military recruiting.50  In Schenck, he announced a seemingly speech-
protective test but applied it in such a way that upheld the conviction of 
 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 40–41. 
 49 Id. at 40. 
 50 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216–17 (1919). 
BLOCHER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  9:40 PM 
118 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:105 
a person who had criticized the draft.51  And in the third—applying 
Schenck—he upheld the conviction of a draft-criticizing newspaper.52  
Whether Abrams can be technically squared with these and others 
of Holmes’s opinions53 is a matter of scholarly debate.54  Certainly 
something changed in 1919.  Having written an earlier opinion that 
essentially limited the free speech clause to a narrow, Blackstonian 
focus on prior restraints,55 Holmes’s opinion in Schenck—while hardly 
a civil liberties jeremiad—came very close to acknowledging a change 
of heart: “It may well be that the prohibition of laws abridging the 
freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to 
prevent them may have been the main purpose, as intimated in 
Patterson v. Colorado.”56 
In Abrams, the change is even more pronounced.  As noted above, 
Holmes’s opinion rejected the “bad tendency” approach, thereby 
providing a stronger basis for protecting free speech claims going 
forward.  But at the jurisprudential level, the more subtle and 
potentially more significant change was that Holmes specifically 
embraced the clear and present danger test and, with the marketplace 
metaphor, gave it a theoretical justification.57 
Indeed, the opinion itself seems to change its mind.  As noted above, 
Holmes begins by laying out the “perfectly logical” case in favor of 
persecuting opinions with which one disagrees.  Had he stopped there, 
he likely would have been writing a majority opinion, and tilting the 
trajectory of free speech in quite a different direction than the one we 
 
 51 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 52 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
 53 See, e.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 276–77 (1915) (upholding conviction 
for incitement of nude sunbathing); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) 
(holding that First Amendment is focused exclusively on prior restraints, not ex post 
punishments for speech); McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 
1892) (upholding termination of police officer on the basis of his political speech).  
 54 See, e.g., David S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 99 (1982) (“It is a thesis of this article that the different tone of the 
Abrams dissent is not evidence of a marked change in Holmes’s view of free speech, but 
is rather the product of Holmes’s frustration at what he considered the misreading by 
critics and the public of his position in Schenck.”). 
 55 Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462. 
 56 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51–52. 
 57 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2356 (2000) (noting that Holmes “virtually invented both First 
Amendment theory and First Amendment doctrine. He advanced the theory of the 
marketplace of ideas, and he demonstrated how doctrine would have to evolve to 
correspond to this new theory.”); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First 
Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1278 n.97 (2005) [hereinafter Schauer, Towards] 
(noting the view that “the First Amendment started in 1919” with Abrams). 
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are discussing at this symposium.58  But, having given censorship 
perhaps the most powerful defense it has ever received in a Supreme 
Court opinion, he then pivoted and did the same for freedom of speech.  
The fulcrum is persuadability: “when men have realized that time has 
upset many fighting faiths.”  
It was not time alone that upset Holmes’s own fighting faith, but a 
sustained campaign of personal and intellectual change, driven by 
debates with trusted friends.  Holmes seemed to regard those one-on-
one discussions, rather than public discourse and debate, as the most 
powerful engine of persuasion.  Writing to the diplomat Lewis Einstein, 
Holmes reiterated his logic-of-persecution argument with regard to 
“fundamental difference[s]” between “side[s],” but suggested that 
discussion might be more open and fruitful in “private life”: “I agree that 
the logical result of a fundamental difference is for one side to kill the 
other, and that persecution has much to be said for it; but in private life 
we think it more comfortable for disagreement to end in discussion or 
silence.”59  The availability of “discussion” as a remedy to 
“disagreement” in “private life” was something which, like love of 
granite, had been instilled in Holmes from a young age—his father was, 
after all, the Autocrat of the Breakfast Table.60  Throughout his long life, 
Holmes’s home was marked by a constant flow of discussion and debate, 
and he was of course a common visitor at the “House of Truth.”61 
Healy’s account of Abrams fills in the story of an “intense behind-
the-scenes effort to change the mind of a legal icon” and of “intellectual 
exploration and emotional growth.”62  The protagonists in that story—
the architects of Holmes’s transformation—were friends and colleagues 
like Harold Laski, Learned Hand, and Felix Frankfurter, who won him 
over with the power of their personal relationships as well as the ideas 
they presented.  Healy emphasizes that “[t]hrough the intervention of 
his friends and his own willingness to adapt, he had come to see free 
speech from a different, more personal perspective.  And from that 
moment forward, he became the champion of the First Amendment we 
 
 58 To my knowledge, there have been no symposia marking the centennials of Debs, 
Frohwerk, or Schenck.  If we were here nine months ago, the tenor and substance of our 
discussions would be quite different. 
 59 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., J. to Lewis David Einstein (July 11, 1918), 
reprinted in THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS, 168–69 (J.P. Peabody ed., 1964). 
 60 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, SR., THE AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST-TABLE (Phillips, 
Sampson and Co. 1858).  
 61 See generally Brad Snyder, The House That Built Holmes, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 661 
(2012) (describing Holmes’s interactions with the House, as well as its role in building 
his legend).  
 62 HEALY, supra note 15, at 8. 
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know him as today, writing passionate dissents on behalf of radicals and 
subversives throughout the rest of his career.”63 
Of course, personal interventions will not always persuade, nor will 
they always protect speech.  After all, three of Holmes’s colleagues 
visited him at home—even enlisting the support of his wife, Fanny—in 
an unsuccessful effort to persuade him not to issue the Abrams dissent.64  
Holmes saw this coming and wrote to Pollock: “I feel sure that the 
majority will very highly disapprove of my saying what I think, but as 
yet it seems to me my duty.  No doubt I shall hear about it on Saturday 
at our conference and perhaps be persuaded to shut up, but I don’t 
expect it.”65  Holmes thus signaled the possibility of persuasion 
(“perhaps be persuaded to shut up”) even as he minimized its likelihood 
(“but I don’t expect it”).  This general discomfort with the practice of 
persuasion raises an important question: did Holmes acknowledge 
change, and does it matter if he did?  
C.  Acknowledging Change 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Holmes changed his mind.  
But he was reluctant to acknowledge the change—to show persuasion 
at work, and not just to describe and defend it.  He wrote in Abrams, “I 
never have seen any reason to doubt that the questions of law alone that 
were before this Court in the cases of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs were 
rightly decided.”66  And yet, as Healy notes, “Holmes purported to stand 
by his earlier opinions.”67 
That is not to say that Holmes totally denied the change, or that he 
refused to acknowledge the influence of Laski, Hand, Zechariah Chafee, 
and others who had worked so hard to bring it about.  In a later letter to 
Chafee explaining his use of the phrase “clear and present danger,” 
Holmes wrote, “I think it came without doubt after the later cases (and 
probably you—I do not remember exactly) had taught me that in the 
earlier Paterson [sic] case, if that was the name of it, I had taken 
Blackstone and Parker of Mass. as well founded, wrongly.  I simply was 
ignorant.”68  As Healy notes (taking the phrase as a chapter title), “I 
simply was ignorant.  It was the closest Holmes would ever come to 
 
 63 Id. at 244.  
 64 Id. at 1–5, (“Nowhere else in the annals of the Supreme Court has there been such 
a personal appeal to one justice by a group of his colleagues.”).  
 65 Id. at 213. 
 66 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 21 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 67 HEALY, supra note 15, at 201; id. at 3 (noting that “something had changed” in 
Abrams). 
 68 Id. at 243 (internal citation omitted). 
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admitting that he had been wrong.  Even in Abrams, he had continued to 
insist that Debs and the other cases were correctly decided.”69 
Of course, admitting prior ignorance has a different cast than 
admitting persuasion.  The former is about the acquisition of knowledge, 
the latter about the changing of existing beliefs.  Holmes seems to cast 
the latter as the former.  Does acknowledging persuasion matter?  
The modest normative claim of this Essay is that it does.  It is 
important, and a free speech virtue, to acknowledge and explore the 
experience of being persuaded.  Although it is impertinent even to 
suggest it, the Abrams dissent itself might have been an even more 
powerful opinion—or at least a more powerful act—if Holmes had made 
explicit that he had personally “come to believe” something new; that 
his own “fighting faith” had been upset.  
That such moments of persuasion may be rare is all the more 
reason to call them out when they happen, both for the persuaded 
individual and the broader system of free speech.  For the individual, 
recognizing a change of heart—and calling it what it is—can and should 
be a part of intellectual development.  We learn not only by acquiring 
new facts and information but by revising our beliefs in accordance.  
And yet we tend to celebrate the former while downplaying the latter.  
The result can only be stifling to the marketplace of ideas.  
Psychologists and rhetoricians have undoubtedly studied these 
issues in depth, and I make no claims to depth or originality with regard 
to human cognition.  My more modest goal is to suggest that these issues 
matter for the pursuit-of-truth version of free speech.  Normalizing 
changes of mind can help facilitate them.  And that, in turn, would 
facilitate the marketplace of ideas, making it easier for “ideas” to get 
themselves “accepted” even by people who already have ideas of their 
own.  After all, there is often no better way to get others to change their 
minds than to demonstrate a willingness and ability to change one’s 
own.  
The point is not that people should repudiate their existing beliefs 
in favor of a pointless and weak-minded credulity, nor that every idea is 
equally persuasive.  It is important, especially in the context of a truth-
based account of free speech, to build and maintain the mechanisms of 
justified true belief.70  An uncritical and misbegotten persuadability 
could potentially contribute to radicalization, paralysis, or anomie: the 
“collapse of creeds” that Holmes referenced, decades before Abrams, in 
 
 69 Id. at 243. 
 70 See generally Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief, supra note 10 (arguing 
that justified true belief, rather than truth alone, may provide a better lodestar for an 
epistemic theory of free speech).  
BLOCHER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  9:40 PM 
122 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:105 
his “Soldier’s Faith” speech.71  But one can regard persuadability as a 
free speech virtue without valorizing those who are taken in by Russian 
propaganda or the endless assault of disinformation from the Trump 
White House.  
In fact, a failure to acknowledge and explore persuadability can 
have its own radicalizing effects.  If changing one’s mind is not seen as a 
normal—even desirable—outcome of a discussion, then the threshold 
for doing so will undoubtedly be higher.  If a person who has changed 
her mind faces pressure to justify doing so, she will almost inevitably be 
pushed (even if only internally) either to refuse the change or to 
exaggerate both the weaknesses of her prior belief and the strengths of 
the new one.  And if one can only adopt a new idea with the zeal of the 
converted, as opposed to the curiosity of the seeker, it is not hard to 
imagine how knowledge, discourse, and democracy will all be distorted.  
This negative view is, admittedly, consistent with much of Holmes’s 
own writing—he sometimes described persuasion as a kind of combat, 
in which to be persuaded was to be defeated.  After all, even amid his 
own conversion into the Justice who would pen the Abrams dissent, he 
wrote to Hand that “man’s destiny is to fight.  Therefore take thy place 
on the one side or the other, if with the added grace of knowing that the 
enemy is as good a man as thou, so much the better, but kill him if thou 
canst.”72  He then professed agreement with Hand’s latest letter to him—
the one, cited above, which linked tolerance and incredulity.73 
In the very next paragraph of that letter, Holmes returned to his 
“can’t help” formulation of truth, echoing almost word-for-word the 
letter to Pollock cited above: 
When I say a thing is true I mean that I can’t help believing it—
and nothing more.  But as I observe that the Cosmos is not 
always limited by my Cant Helps I don’t bother about absolute 
truth or even inquire whether there is such a thing, but define 
the Truth as the system of my limitations.  I may add that as 
other men are subject to a certain number, but not all, of my 
Cant Helps, intercourse is possible.  When I was young I used 
to define the truth as the majority vote of the nation that can 
lick all others.  So we may define the present war as an inquiry 
concerning truth.74 
 
 71 HOLMES, supra note 8, at 487. 
 72 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., J., Sup. Ct., to Learned Hand, J., U.S. Dist. 
Court, S.D.N.Y. (June 24, 1918) [hereinafter Holmes-Hand Letter] (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library), https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:4309758
0$18i. 
 73 See Weinstein, supra note 24, at 69. 
 74 See Holmes-Hand Letter, supra note 72. 
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Others in Holmes’s intellectual milieu employed similarly militaristic 
metaphors, perhaps most notably Milton in Areopagitica: “Let [truth] 
and falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free 
and open encounter?” 75 
In this frame, changes in belief represent defeat, rather than 
growth, and it should not be surprising if people are reluctant to own up 
to them.  And yet, as Felix Frankfurter, one of Holmes’s self-styled 
proteges, once put it: “Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought 
not to reject it merely because it comes late.”76  The question is how 
social practices and law itself can keep the door open for later-arriving 
wisdom, especially if admitting it would mean displacing existing 
beliefs. 
In fact, law has probably done more than most disciplines to 
grapple with the practice of persuasion.  But understanding what it 
takes to persuade is different from understanding what it takes to be 
persuaded.  And that makes sense, at least for training lawyers, because 
mostly their job is to serve as advocates—to persuade a judge, for 
example—not to be persuaded by opposing counsel.  But the result may 
be that we focus on rhetoric77—which no less authority than Aristotle 
defined as “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available 
means of persuasion”78—rather than the other side of the equation: 
what it means to be persuaded, to be a consumer rather than producer 
of rhetoric. 
Within legal discourse, the more fruitful place to find the principle 
of persuadability at work is on the bench, not in the bar.  Judges, after 
all, are not cast as advocates, but are expected to approach evidence and 
arguments with an open mind, and also (and more significantly for 
present purposes) to tailor or alter their beliefs accordingly.  The law 
has devoted substantial energy to exploring and explaining the 
appropriate bases for such changes. 
 
 75 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING 45 (H.B. 
Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co. 1959) (1644).  See also Vincent Blasi, A Readers Guide to 
John Milton’s Areopagitica, the Foundational Essay of the First Amendment Tradition, 
2017 SUP. CT. REV. 273. 
 76 Henslee v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 77 See supra note 17 and sources cited therein.  Holmes attended law school at a time 
when rhetoric was still a standard part of the law school curriculum in many places, 
though it would soon be phased out as part of the Langdellian revolution.  Linda Levine 
& Kurt M. Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 108, 111 (1993) (internal 
footnotes omitted). 
 78 1 ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 37 (George A. Kennedy, trans., 
2007). 
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It is clear, of course, that courts as institutions “change their 
minds,” and sometimes—as when they overturn a precedent—they do 
so explicitly and give reasons.  But, more notably for present purposes, 
even specific judges sometimes have a change of heart, and vote to 
overturn a precedent that they helped write into law.  Holmes’s own 
opinion in Abrams is a signal example, as explained above.  (Somewhat 
ironically, perhaps, Hand and Frankfurter themselves seemed to change 
their minds in the other direction, writing First Amendment opinions in 
United States v. Dennis that went a long way to eviscerating the 
principles Holmes laid out in Abrams.79) 
But other examples are not hard to find.  Justice Thomas did so in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey,80 noting that he regretted his vote for the 
majority conclusion in Almendarez-Torres v. United States just two years 
earlier.81  Justice Marshall voted with the majority in Terry v. Ohio, but 
only four years later he concluded in dissent in Adams v. Williams that 
“the delicate balance that Terry struck was simply too delicate, too 
susceptible to the ‘hydraulic pressures’ of the day.”82  In the First 
Amendment context, Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in Roth 
v. United States83 but wrote (in dissent) in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 
that he regretted it.84  Some judges declare their changes of heart after 
having left the bench.85  
Of course, it would be too much to say that such changes—or at 
least such candor—is the norm for judges, even if it might be desirable.86  
Perhaps scholars might consider looking closer to home.   
 
 79 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 213 (1950) (Hand, J.) (upholding convictions of 
Communist organizers on the basis that they presented a “clear and present” danger).  
 80 530 U.S. 466, 520–21 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 81 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
 82 407 U.S. 143, 162 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 83 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
 84 413 U.S. 49, 73–74 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 85 See, e.g., MICHAEL GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF THE 
JUDICIAL RIGHT 213 (2017) (noting reports that Justice Lewis Powell initially changed his 
mind in joining the Bowers v. Hardwick majority, and that four years later he said he 
“probably made a mistake in voting with the majority”); RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS 
ON JUDGING 84–85 (2013) (“I plead guilty to having written the majority opinion 
upholding Indiana’s requirement that prospective voters prove their identity with a 
photo ID—a type of law now widely regarded as a means of voter suppression rather 
than fraud prevention.”); JOHN PAUL STEVENS, THE MAKING OF A JUSTICE: MY FIRST NINETY FOUR 
YEARS (2019) (noting a “somewhat embarrassing to acknowledge” misreading of a line 
of cases in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)). 
 86 Jeffrey S. Sutton, Barnette, Frankfurter, and Judicial Review, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 133, 
149 (2012) (“Judges are not known for admitting their mistakes, and perhaps that is a 
tradition that should change. In any given year, I sit on roughly ten to twenty cases that 
reverse decisions of district court judges. Is it not possible that appellate judges and 
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III.  THINGSTERS, IDEASTS, AND PERSUADABILITY IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP  
In 2019, Harvard Law School held an event called “Why I Changed 
My Mind.”87  In a panel discussion, four members of the law faculty 
described things about which they had changed their minds—matters 
like the private purposes interpretation of the Second Amendment 
(Laurence Tribe) and the complexity of William Jennings Bryan (Jill 
Lepore).  The panel was well-attended, and there was some talk of 
making it an annual event.  But how, one might ask, will they fill another 
panel? 
The question is serious in two ways: it is genuine, in the sense that 
it is legitimately difficult to identify scholars who have openly 
repudiated views they once held, and it is potentially important, in the 
sense that it may shed some light on how scholars—or scholarly 
discourse—change over time in response to new ideas.  
The connection to Abrams and the preceding discussion should 
hopefully be plain.  If there is any area of discourse in which the 
“competition of ideas” is front and center, and “fighting faiths” regularly 
upset, one might expect it to be academia.  But, again borrowing from 
Abrams, when do we “realize” that fact and when do we “come to 
believe” anything different than what we already do?  Or was Holmes 
right to say (as he did when urging Frankfurter to steer clear of it) that 
“academic life is but half life—it is a withdrawal from the fight in order 
to utter smart things that cost you nothing except the thinking them 
from a cloister”?88  
Unsurprisingly, Holmes’s description strikes me, and presumably 
most of us who have chosen the half life, as a bit unfair.  A scholarly 
symposium or debate-in-print is hardly Antietam (one of three Civil War 
battles in which Holmes was wounded89) or even a courtroom, for that 
matter—but there are stakes, and a “fight.”  It is, at its best, the ideal 
form of the “competition of the market” that Abrams celebrates.  And, in 
 
justices have similar rates of error?”).  Not everyone agrees that such candor would be 
desirable.  Charles Lane, Judge Richard Posner’s Mea Culpa Was Better Left Unsaid, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 21, 2013 (“If it is realistic to be skeptical about judges’ capacity for deciding 
cases objectively, why should we trust their subsequent claims of error?”). 
 87 Laurence Tribe, Jill Lepore, Jeannie Suk Gersen & Kendra Albert, Professors, 
Harvard University, Panel Discussion at Harvard Law School: Why I Changed My Mind 
(Mar. 4, 2019) (recording available at HARV. L. TODAY, https://today.law.harvard.edu/
why-i-changed-my-mind/) 
 88 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Felix Frankfurter (July 15, 1913), in 
HOLMES AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912–1934, at 12–13 (Robert M. 
Mennel & Christine L. Compston eds., 1996). 
 89 Holmes’s father wrote a somewhat overwrought postscript, “My Hunt for the 
Captain,” which was published in the Atlantic Monthly and for which his son never quite 
forgave him.  BUDIANSKY, supra note 19, at 97–99. 
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keeping with the present theme, things change in the legal academy.  
Schools of thought rise and fall, often in direct opposition or repudiation 
of what preceded them.  
How that change happens is far, far beyond the scope of this Essay 
or the abilities of its author to address.  My goal is not to attempt any 
novel intervention into the literature on intellectual history or the life 
cycles of legal theory90 but rather to locate in legal scholarship a 
principle that I have argued is important to free speech—persuadability.  
In particular, I hope to identify and explore incidents like the Harvard 
panel, wherein scholars do what Holmes stopped short of doing in 
Abrams—experience persuasion and acknowledge it.  
I do not mean to suggest that law is a unique or uniquely 
problematic scholarly debate in this regard.  One could ask similar 
questions all over campus.  Sometimes philosophers renounce their 
frameworks,91 or empiricists issue revisions or admit errors in their 
data.  In fact, in recent years, there have been a few notable efforts to 
encourage social scientists to alter or reject their own prior conclusions 
when appropriate,92 or to “[t]rack[] retractions as a window into the 
scientific process.”93  But even the former has been described as an 
effort to “create a radical new culture.”94 
What is true in other disciplines seems to be true in law as well: 
legal scholars rarely acknowledge when or why they have changed their 
minds.  This is admittedly a hard claim to prove, and I make it with some 
hesitation.  Although I have researched the question as best I can and 
relied on reference librarians, colleagues, research assistants, and 
patient friends to provide examples, I am quite conscious that I might be 
missing obvious ones, and that readers might at this very moment be 
 
 90 For one recent and insightful account within the legal literature, see Jeremy K. 
Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal 
Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819 (2016).  See also, of course, DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND 
FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (1998). 
 91 Ludwig Wittgenstein, to take one obvious example, spent the second half of his 
career attempting to demolish what he had done in the first with the Tractatus.  He 
described Philosophical Investigations as a rejoinder to “what logicians have said about 
the structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)” 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 23 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 
1969) (1953). 
 92 Julia M. Rohrer, et al., Putting the Self in Self-Correction: Findings from the Loss-of-
Confidence Project, PsyArXiv (Dec. 12, 2018), https://psyarxiv.com/exmb2/.  
 93 RETRACTION WATCH, https://retractionwatch.com/ (last visited June 21, 2019). 
 94 Brian Resnick, Intellectual Humility: The Importance of Knowing You Might Be 
Wrong, VOX (Jan. 4, 2019, 8:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-
health/2019/1/4/17989224/intellectual-humility-explained-psychology- 
replication. 
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compiling lists.  If so, and in keeping with the theme, I admit the error 
and invite the corrections.  
But I should note that what I have in mind are not the many 
scholars whose corpus contains inconsistencies: who argued X at one 
point and later argued Y (or even not-X), without necessarily 
acknowledging the change.  Many successful scholars with a large 
enough oeuvre, and who have defeated the hobgoblin,95 will exhibit and 
even celebrate such inconsistencies.96  
This Essay is concerned with a certain subset of those cases—those 
in which a scholar believed something, was later convinced otherwise, 
and (this is the hardest part to find) acknowledged the change.97  
Illustrations of these are hard to come by, though again the difficulty of 
constructing a search may be partially to blame.  The ready examples 
tend to be those one has noticed in passing.  In First Amendment 
scholarship, two examples come immediately to mind.  
First, in a footnote of Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of 
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, then-Professor Elena 
Kagan noted that she had become un-persuaded by an argument she 
relied on just four years earlier.98  Specifically, she noted the argument 
(citing Alexander Meiklejohn and her colleague Geoffrey Stone) that the 
purpose of the First Amendment’s content-neutrality rule is to protect 
the “thinking processes of the community” from distortion.99  She went 
on: “I used the argument with respect to R.A.V. in [Elena Kagan, The 
Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v St. Paul, Rust v 
Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 S. CT. 
 
 95 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS AND ENGLISH TRAITS 63, 70 (C.W. Eliot 
ed., 1909) (“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little 
statesmen and philosophers and divines.”).  Emerson, a friend of Holmes’s father, was 
something of a mentor.  BUDIANSKY, supra note 19, at 58–61, 152–53.  
 96 See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Tushnet’s Realism, Tushnet’s Liberalism, 90 GEO. L.J. 199, 
208–13 (2001) (charting apparent changes in Mark Tushnet’s scholarship); James M. 
Oleske, Jr., The Born-Again Champion of Conscience, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 78 (2015) 
(“[W]hile today [Robert] George waxes nostalgic about the widespread denunciation of 
[Employment Division v.] Smith, in 1998 he praised the decision as ‘impeccably faithful 
to the original meaning of the ‘Free Exercise Clause.’”). 
 97 See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, Summers’s Primer on Fuller’s Jurisprudence—A 
Wholly Disinterested Assessment of the Reviews by Professors Wueste and Lebel, 71 
CORNELL L. REV. 1231, 1234 (1986) (“Several years ago, when I reread Fuller prior to 
writing my book on his work, I had a change of mind.  I now believe that Fuller’s 
principles of legality do have a justified claim to being a morality.”). 
 98 Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in 
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 418–19 n.15 (1996) (citing Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM & MARY L. REV. 189, 198 
(1983)). 
 99 Id. 
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REV. 29, 69–71].  As will become clear, I now find the argument 
unpersuasive, both in its application to R.A.V. and more broadly.”100  
Much of the rest of the Article proceeded to clarify how she came to 
believe that “only the purpose-based model can explain the difference in 
the levels of review applicable to content-based and content-neutral 
laws.”101 
Tim Scanlon has been, if anything, even more exasperated by the 
prominence of his own prior view, and his inability now to denounce it:  
A rant: Can we please stop talking about autonomy?  If we were 
to look for a single idea that captures the interests at stake in 
expression that merits First Amendment protection, the idea 
of autonomy would be a bad choice for this role.  (As someone 
who once made a mistaken appeal to autonomy as the 
centerpiece of a theory of freedom of expression, my position 
in the Dantean Inferno of free speech debates seems to be 
repeatedly assailed with misuses of this notion, no matter how 
I criticize them.)102 
A footnote obligingly provides sources for the Scanlon v. Scanlon debate: 
“See generally Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 151, 204 (1972).  I criticize the view presented in that 
article in T.M. Scanlon, Content Regulation Reconsidered, in T.M. SCANLON, 
THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE 151, 161–64 (2003).”103 
Where should one hope to find other similar examples of scholars 
who have repudiated their own prior views?  What kinds of change 
might we expect to see?  Again, this Essay cannot hope to provide a 
comprehensive account, but only to sketch a few possible routes.  And 
indeed, Holmes himself suggested a distinction that might help guide the 
search.  He once posited a difference between “Ideasts” and 
“Thingsters”104—those who theorize, and those who master facts.  He 
placed himself squarely in the former category;105 Justice Brandeis 
would be exemplary of the latter. 
The academy, too, has its Ideasts and Thingsters, and it seems 
plausible that they are persuadable in different ways.  Thingsters are 
more likely to make claims about bodies of discernible facts and to rely 
 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 456 (emphasis added). 
 102 T.M. Scanlon, Why Not Base Free Speech on Autonomy or Democracy?, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 541, 546 (2011) (footnote omitted). 
 103 Id. at n.15. 
 104 HEALY, supra note 15, at 140. 
 105 Id. (“[A]lthough Holmes recognized the value of facts, he personally despised 
them. It was one of the biases he inherited from his father, who complained that facts 
choked his windpipe when he talked.”).  
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on standard scientific hypotheses.  Precisely because they tend to make 
scholarly claims that are more easily susceptible to proof, they are more 
likely to be confronted with evidence and arguments that could 
effectively force an acknowledgment of a changed view.  This is true, for 
example, of historians who misunderstand106 or misrepresent107 their 
source material, or quantitative empiricists who do the same with 
data.108  
One might think of this as simple error correction, a matter of 
“proof” rather than “persuasion,” but it is not clear that the two can be 
easily separated.109  For Thingsters with fact-dependent “can’t helps,” 
changed facts change truths—a completed mathematical proof, a newly 
discovered species, or a cured disease, for example.  Such changes might 
not be immediate or simple, of course—the history and philosophy of 
science is its own discipline, after all—and existing paradigms might be 
able to absorb a great deal of apparently conflicting information before 
they are forced to shift.110  But for a Thingster with an optimistic 
epistemological vision, such shifts can be acknowledged and celebrated 
as another step toward “true” understanding.  
For Ideasts, the situation is a little bit different.  The general 
theories that Holmes said are the Ideasts’ focus probably tend to be less 
susceptible to proof and closer to the kinds of “deep-seated preferences” 
that Holmes suspected are not worth debating, at least if the goal is to 
change someone’s mind.111  Ideasts’ debates tend to the normative, 
rather than descriptive, which complicates the possibility of persuasion.  
Convincing someone that their facts are wrong is one thing; convincing 
them to revise their vision of the good is another.  
 
 106 As I write this, the latest kerfuffle involves Naomi Wolf’s Outrages (2019), 
which—she acknowledged, when confronted with them during a live interview—
contains significant mistakes stemming from her misunderstanding of the words “death 
recorded” in Victorian court records.  Wolf’s response: “It’s such an important story and 
I welcome the chance to correct these two out of hundreds of citations and make it 
perfect.” Parul Sehgal, Naomi Wolf’s Career of Blunders Continues in ‘Outrages’, N.Y. TIMES, 
(June 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/books/review-outrages-
naomi-wolf.html.   
 107 See, e.g., James Lindgren, Fall from Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles 
Scandal, 111 YALE L.J. 2195 (2002). 
 108 See RETRACTION WATCH, supra note 93 (collecting examples of errors, 
misrepresentations, and fraud in scientific research). 
 109 Colin Starger, Constitutional Law and Rhetoric, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1347, 1359 
(2016) (“[I]t is important to recall that pisteis-the word Aristotle used to describe the 
rhetorical genus uniting the species of logos, ethos, and pathos— can also be translated 
as ‘proof.’ Using the same word to describe proof and persuasion hammers home the 
rhetorical perspective on discourse: proof is what persuades.”). 
 110 See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996). 
 111 Holmes, supra note 26, at 41. 
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I do not mean to suggest that Thingsters are more persuadable 
than Ideasts, nor that seemingly fact-bound arguments are free from 
normative priors and motivated reasoning.  The point is simply to 
highlight that persuadability may look different to Thingsters and 
Ideasts.  And even then, the difference is one of degree rather than kind.  
In choosing which facts to master, and what questions to pursue, 
Thingsters are guided by general theories.  And Ideast propositions—
even basic constitutional principles like the marketplace of ideas112—
sometimes rest on Thingster-type suppositions.  One of the original 
promises of originalism, to take one example, can be understood as an 
effort to transform a debate between Ideasts into one between 
Thingsters—a search for historical “facts,” not normative visions of 
constitutional interpretation.  Whether this promise has been or can be 
fulfilled is a debate for another day.  For present purposes, what stands 
out are the general efforts to “empiricize” originalism, including recently 
through corpus linguistics, which can make it possible to evaluate 
originalist queries in a data-driven way.113 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that constitutional law or 
constitutional scholarship can or should be reduced to a system of 
proofs.  What Holmes said of people is true also of constitutional law: 
“[T]he logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for 
repose which is in every human mind.  But certainty generally is illusion, 
and repose is not the destiny of man.”114  The point is simply that 
 
 112 See Frederick Schauer, Discourse and Its Discontents, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309, 
1333 (1997) (“A great deal of free speech theory and a great deal of discourse theory is 
marked by an admirable epistemological optimism, but whether that epistemological 
optimism is well-founded is in the final analysis an empirical question, as to which the 
resources of contemporary social science research might help to locate an answer.”); 
Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1160, 
1160 (2015) (noting that while there is “at best mixed evidence for the [marketplace] 
metaphor’s veracity,” and reporting empirical study of “buffer zones” at polling places 
or abortion clinics). 
 113 Dennis Baron, Corpus Evidence Illuminates the Meaning of Bear Arms, 46 HASTINGS 
CONST. L. Q. 509 (2019); Josh Blackman & James C. Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and the 
Second Amendment, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Aug. 7, 2018), https://blog.harvardlaw
review.org/corpus-linguistics-and-the-second-amendment/ (noting that the authors 
were “persuaded by” Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008), but that “[a]pplying corpus linguistics to the Second Amendment 
leads to potentially uncomfortable criticisms for both the majority and dissenting 
opinions in Heller”); Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “bear”, 
LAWNLINGUISTICS, (Dec. 16, 2018), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2018/12/16/corpora-
and-the-second-amendment-bear/; Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Semantics and the 
Meaning of the Second Amendment, THE PANORAMA (Aug. 3, 2018), http://the
panorama.shear.org/2018/08/03/historical-semantics-and-the-meaning-of-the-
second-amendment/.  
 114 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).  
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whether one is looking for normative persuasion or a demonstration of 
proof, legal scholarship seems to offer few open changes of mind.  
Assuming this is to be true—it is, again, a Thingster-type claim subject 
to disproof—it raises a question.  Why do scholars write as if to 
persuade, and yet so rarely admit to being persuaded?  Should scholars 
more openly acknowledge—and explain—the times when their minds 
have been changed?  
For one thing, persuasion is not the only thing that a scholar 
(especially a young scholar) might want to maximize in her career.  If 
one wants to engage with other scholars, and not necessarily to convert 
or conquer them, then it makes sense to pursue issues for which the 
battlefield is already well set.  That might mean spending time in an 
intellectual trench, without dislodging anyone else from theirs, but 
scholars might still glean whatever is “divine” in academic battles.115 
And persuasion is not the only way, perhaps not even the most 
effective way, to exert scholarly influence.  An alternative, of course, is 
to speak to those who are not yet on the battlefield—to reach the minds 
that are not yet made up.  The underlying premise of the second 
approach is that made-up minds are unlikely to change and that the key 
to scholarly change is to reach new audiences.  Justice Scalia might not 
have won many converts to originalism among those with well-
developed views on constitutional interpretation, but generations of 
law students—his primary audience, he often said116—have now been 
baptized in it.  
An academic discourse in which scholars do not change positions 
is still one in which influence can be had, and certain ideas prevail over 
others.  Students and scholars who have not yet developed their own 
positions might well be won over by one side or another in a scholarly 
debate about, say, originalism.  But in doing so, they will not necessarily 
have received any guidance or incentive to grow any further—to open 
themselves up to subsequent change.  Perhaps a discourse in which 
scholars themselves do not just describe but demonstrate the virtues of 
persuadability would encourage and teach others to do the same. 
While many incentives are admittedly against it, I think there is 
much to like about a system in which scholars—Thingsters, Ideasts, and 
everyone in between—more commonly acknowledge and explain their 
 
 115 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Life Struggle, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM 
THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 
94, 95 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) (“Life is a roar of bargain and battle, but in the very 
heart of it there rises a mystic spiritual tone that gives meaning to the whole.”). 
 116 See, e.g., Adam J. White, Antonin Scalia, Legal Educator, 33 NAT’L AFFAIRS (2017) 
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/antonin-scalia-legal-educator. 
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changes of heart.  Those reasons (suspicions might be a better word) 
track, in large part, those recounted above as to why open 
persuadability might be a virtue for a broader system of free speech.117  
For one thing, it might help create a scholarly discourse that is more self-
consciously persuasive and persuadable.  If (and this is of course an if) 
the goal of scholarly discourse is to provide the “best test” of truth, then 
presumably we should be the ones willing and able to “accept” it.  
For this to happen, it is useful, though not essential, for scholars 
explicitly to change over time and to explain why.  As Kagan and Scanlon 
do in the examples quoted above, explaining why one has changed one’s 
mind is not only fair to the author/creator of the persuasive argument—
it gives credit where credit is due—but also helps identify and teach the 
kinds of arguments that are successful in changing individual minds. 
Moreover, to the degree that law professors describe and extol the 
value of open-mindedness and persuadability—celebrating the 
tendency of a legal education to open and stretch students’ minds, and 
sometimes bemoaning students’ perceived unwillingness to be 
confronted with distasteful ideas—we might as well model it ourselves.  
If the marketplace of ideas is to be modeled, not just described, then one 
would hope and expect to see scholars noting and explaining the points 
in the “competition” when they “came to realize” that their own “fighting 
faiths” could be displaced. 
Why, then, does this occur so rarely in law reviews?  Surely the 
answers vary from scholar to scholar, school to school, and field to field, 
but one can at least imagine a range of explanations.   
The obvious one is that there is nothing to acknowledge: one 
doesn’t read of scholars having changes of mind because their minds 
don’t change.  This is of course the explanation suggested by Part I 
above, and from my perspective it is discouraging—not so much for the 
development of legal scholarship as a whole (it can and will continue to 
change, for all the reasons described above), but for the scholars who 
entered the academy nominally seeking truth only to behave as if they 
arrived in full possession of it.  
Another is that individual intellectual change comes gradually and 
incrementally, not all at once, such that it is difficult to pinpoint the 
moment at which one’s mind “changed”—just as it might be hard to 
identify with precision the point on a spectrum at which red shades into 
blue.  Relatedly, scholars might believe that their own internal 
intellectual development is simply not newsworthy, as it were—that 
their own voyages of intellectual self-discovery need not be explained to 
 
 117 See supra Section II.0 
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anyone else.  But to the degree that scholars hold back on 
acknowledging their development, that seems to be a lost opportunity 
to provide a map to the roads they can’t help traveling.  
IV.  CONCLUSION  
Holmes’s First Amendment opinions were handed down at a time 
of incredible national anxiety.  Many of them—Abrams very much 
included—involved speech about wars, the draft, anarchy, and the very 
future of the United States.  It is easy, at a century removed and with a 
new set of anxieties, to lose track of how significant those challenges 
must have seemed and how high the stakes: it was not the First 
Amendment at stake but the nation.  
How far away, and yet how familiar.  Our contemporary anxieties 
and challenges have different roots, but they are again imbricated with 
issues of free speech.  Many feel that the nation is again under threat, 
both from within and without, and that the main threats include 
tribalism, closed-mindedness, and a loss of faith in the very nature of 
truth.  Abrams is a major part of that discussion.  But the part of the 
opinion that might be most relevant is not its concept of “truth,” but its 
treatment of persuadability.  
Appropriately enough, that theme can be summed up by an 
internet meme.  In 2018, a conservative comedian and commentator 
Tweeted a picture of himself seated on a university campus, sipping a 
cup of coffee, behind a table with a sign on it reading: “Male Privilege is 
a Myth—Change My Mind.”118  In short order, hundreds of internet 
parodies popped up, Photoshopping in other absurd topics of 
persuasion.119  It might not be the shout of fire in a crowded theater, but 
the image of a person defiantly challenging others to change his mind 
deserves a place in the First Amendment iconography as well. 
 
 118 Steven Crowder (@scrowder), TWITTER, (Feb. 16, 2018, 2:09 PM), 
https://twitter.com/scrowder/status/964577508447449088. 
 119 Among the less profane examples: “Australians are Just British Texans”; “Pluto is 
a planet”; “I’m a bad person And deserve to die”; “Spring is Here.” Steven Crowder’s 
“Change My Mind” Campus Sign Images, KNOWYOURMEME, https://knowyourmeme.com/
memes/steven-crowders-change-my-mind-campus-sign (last visited Jul 29, 2019).  
